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Crime, Institutions and Sector-Specific FDI in Latin America 
 
I. Introduction 
Factors affecting economic growth and development have often been used to study crime 
trends but recent studies have also begun to examine how the prevalence of crime, especially 
violent crime, can affect economic growth (see for example Detotto and Otranto, 2010). One 
of the channels through which high rates of crime can impact economic growth is through the 
destruction of physical and human capital as well as serving to discourage future domestic 
and foreign investment. For developing countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) is of 
particular importance to economic growth as it allows for the development of productive 
capacity, infrastructure, and technological improvements that may not be possible to fund 
domestically. At the same time, the destabilizing effects of crime in the host country as well 
as the loss in productivity and the increase in security costs are likely to reduce FDI flows.  
Historically, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is one region where the need to 
attract FDI has coexisted with the reality of high crime rates (Soares and Naritomi, 2010). 
Since the 1980s, economic growth in the region has lagged behind rates of growth for middle-
income countries in general, and of East Asia, in particular. The reasons for this are not 
perfectly understood but the accumulation of capital is part of the problem. National savings 
rates in Latin America tend to be low relative to faster growing middle-income countries. 
Given this, inflows of FDI become even more important to enhance economic growth. As a 
result, understanding the determinants of FDI inflows in Latin America indirectly helps to 
explain overall economic growth in the region.  
There is a substantial body of literature on the determinants of inward FDI into Latin 
America.1 However, there are still a number of issues concerning these inflows for which 
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there is little or no knowledge. Most importantly, the overwhelming majority of empirical 
research on FDI is concerned with overall inflows. Yet, there is some evidence that the 
determinants of FDI vary by sector of the economy (Walsh and Yu, 2010). Unless one makes 
the strong assumption that FDI determinants are invariant across sectors, there may be 
important information about the drivers of FDI inflows that is lost in the process of 
aggregation. Even if the determinants are common, it is unlikely that their influence would be 
identical across all sectors. This is particularly true in the case of Latin America as FDI in the 
region has been overweight in primary commodities. As a result, any disaggregation of the 
data by sectors may yield important insights regarding sectoral dynamics (Ferraz et al., 2011; 
Hecock and Jepsen, 2014).  
Crime can be seen as a component of the broader concept of institutional quality which 
has been an important determinant of FDI in LAC. In general, previous literature has shown 
that the presence of weak institutions is a limiting factor of economic growth in developing 
countries (Engerman and Solokoff, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2003, 2005). One of the channels 
through which better institutional quality matters for growth may be through increased 
inflows of FDI. While this idea is not original to this paper, it is of particular interest for Latin 
America. Institutional quality has usually not been thought of as a strength in the region. Prior 
to the 1980s, the region was characterised by a collection of authoritarian regimes not 
generally noted for enhancing institutions critical for economic development such as the rule 
of law. The economic and political turmoil of the “Lost Decade” of the 1980s produced 
political changes that spurred improvements in institutional quality in many countries of the 
region. A historical account of the evolution of institutions for the region shows that there is a 
link between improvements in institutional quality and growth in Latin American economies 
(Przeworski and Curvale, 2007).2 What is particularly interesting for our purposes is that FDI 
in the region began a long boom. It went from 0.7 percent of GDP in 1990 to nearly 4.6 
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percent of GDP in 2013 (United Nations, ECLAC, 2013).  Logically, the increase in FDI and 
the improvement in institutional quality should be related.  However, although there is some 
evidence that better institutional quality has a positive impact on the overall flows of FDI 
(Fukumi and Nishjima, 2010; Penfold, 2014), little is known about how changes in 
institutional quality affect FDI by sector and these effects are unlikely to be uniform.   
Moreover, in the case of Latin America, the relation between crime and institutions 
seems paradoxical. While there has been a reported improvement in the quality of institutions, 
crime has also increased and it is at the forefront of the public policy agenda. In the last 
decade crime rates have increased significantly, leading to the region receiving the title of one 
of the most violent regions of the world (Di Tella et al., 2010; UNDP, 2013). A recent study 
about crime and violence in Latin America states that the homicide rates in Latin American 
countries are considered by the World Health Organization to be at an epidemic level (UNDP, 
2013). The statistics are staggering. According to a World Bank report, Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries not only account for over 30 percent of the world’s homicides but also 
include seven of the top-ten countries with the world’s highest homicide rates. In addition, 42 
cities in the region make the list of the 50 cities with the highest homicide rates in the world 
(World Bank, 2013). 
 The improvement in institutional quality may be indeed counteracted by the crime trends 
and therefore, the overall impact on FDI needs to be explored. This divergence between 
improvements in institutional quality along with increasing crime rates may have potentially 
important impacts on the trajectory of FDI. There is evidence in the literature that in Latin 
America, violent crime has generated distrust in institutions (Blanco, 2013; Blanco and Ruiz, 
2013; Corbacho et al., 2015). Distrust in institutions can in turn be reflected in weaker 
business networks, and it can increase the costs of setting up and expanding businesses in 
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Latin America. Therefore, crime should not be overlooked and needs to be taken into account 
in the study of the determinants of FDI. After all, as hypothesised by Pshiva and Suarez 
(2002), violent crime in developing countries may help explain the Lucas (1990) puzzle of 
capital not flowing to developing countries. In addition, as we have stressed above, a sectoral 
analysis becomes pertinent in this context as it would be naive to expect the impact of crime 
to be identical across sectors. 
The focus of this article is to investigate the impact of institutional quality and violent 
crime on FDI. We contribute to the literature by looking at how crime and institutions are 
interrelated as determinants of FDI in different sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Because the incidence of crime may have a differential impact across sectors of the economy, 
we explore the possibility that it affects FDI in some sectors more than others. To this end, we 
decompose total FDI inflows into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. We use three 
indicators related to violent crime: homicide rates, crime victimization index, and organised 
crime index. These three measures capture different but related aspects to crime. We find that 
the significance of institutions disappears with the presence of crime and that the impact of 
crime on FDI depends on the sector and types of crime considered. In particular, the homicide 
rate has a robust negative and significant impact on the secondary sector while organised 
crime matters only for the tertiary sector. Interestingly, crime victimization impacts both the 
secondary and tertiary sector. The primary sector on the other hand, seems non responsive to 
crime. 
Our findings point at the importance of looking at sector specific dynamics. Previous 
evidence suggests that since the primary sector is resource seeking, it is less vulnerable to the 
quality of institutions and therefore, we might expect firms to be less sensitive to crime. In 
this context, our results for the primary sector are sensible. The secondary sector is impacted 
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only when we consider homicide rates and crime victimization. FDI in the secondary sector 
mostly refers to manufacturing and it is motivated by cost advantages in the form of low 
labour costs. Homicides rates reflect the most violent form of crime and therefore might 
influence perceptions of production cost, and ultimately affect FDI in this sector.  
In the tertiary (services) sector, firms are generally motivated to invest with the purpose 
of serving that specific market. Investment in this sector is associated with tourism, 
education, financial services, and real estate, among others. Our analysis shows that, on 
average, crime victimization and organised crime have a robust significant and negative 
impact on FDI flows to this sector. Since much of the service sector encompasses activities in 
which human interaction matters (tourism is a primary example here), a high prevalence of 
organised crime may create a generalised perception of danger and therefore discourage 
investment. In addition, the racketeering practices of many mafia-like organizations are likely 
to affect services more than manufacturing because the latter is more insulated from day-to-
day interaction with the local business environment and relies less on such interaction to build 
a customer base. The findings also relate to anecdotal evidence from Venezuela where the 
escalation of crime has forced business (such as restaurants) to change their business practices 
as an ever-growing number of customers do not feel safe to visit after dark (Rosati, 2015). In 
fact, Venezuela now stands as having one of the highest crime rates in the world, the second 
highest after Honduras. 
The next section (section II) provides a conceptual framework and the empirical 
evidence. This is followed by a section (section III) describing the data used and the empirical 
methodology employed. Section IV and V provide a description of the results and the 
robustness tests, and this is followed by a conclusion (Section VI). 
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II. FDI, Institutions and Crime: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence 
Our paper focuses on the impact of crime on sectoral FDI. Loosely speaking, our approach 
looks at a wider definition of crime by focusing on violent crime, where we take into account 
three different crime measures: homicide rates, crime victimization and organised crime. 
Previous work in the literature has focused on the impact of political instability and 
corruption on domestic and foreign investment. While these are important, and could 
arguably be linked to the general definition of crime, they have already been studied on their 
own right and/or through the links between FDI and institutions. In general, some of the 
findings also indicate that the impacts of institutional improvement differ depending on the 
sector where FDI flows. For example, the primary sector seems to be less vulnerable to the 
quality of institutions while market-seeking sectors seem to be more responsive.3  
Why focus primarily on crime? There is a long quest in the economic literature trying to 
understand the determinants of FDI (see for example, Blonigen and Piger, 2011). In the 
particular case of Latin America, FDI has been thought of as conducive to economic growth 
(De Melo, 1997; Borensztein et al., 1998), and the potential externalities of FDI are linked to 
economic development and employment.4 Therefore, there has been a strong desire to 
understand the determinants of FDI into the region and the different channels through which 
Latin American countries are able to attract FDI in order to create a more positive 
environment for foreign investors. While many of the countries in the region have had 
impressive achievements in generating welcoming environments to foreign investors, crime 
has been a major concern for most countries of the region and it has reached peak levels 
during the last decade (Gaviria, 2002; Soarez and Naritomi, 2010).  
It is very likely that the increasing levels of crime can act as a deterrent for foreign firms 
setting up different types of investment in the region. In particular, crime can potentially 
affect both greenfield investments and merger and acquisitions (M&A), having consequences 
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for both the stock of FDI through reduction or closure of operations and/or the flow of FDI 
through reduced new investment and reinvestment and by lowered incentives to expand. 
Firms may delay expansion or further investment because high crime can add to the firm’s 
costs (damaged infrastructure, unstable market demand, high security costs, insurance and 
other legal costs) and can force firms to choose locations that are low in crime but otherwise 
suboptimal (Amin, 2014; Dadzie et al., 2014). More broadly, crime can have a strong impact 
on institutional stability and the overall business environment (Soares and Naritomi, 2010).  
Despite the escalating importance of crime in the Latin American region, the literature on 
crime and FDI is scant. While there is previous evidence on the impact of crime on domestic 
investment, to our knowledge, Gomez Soler (2012) might be the only empirical analysis on 
the impact of crime on FDI in the Latin America region. While there is a dearth of empirical 
evidence of the impact of crime on FDI at the country level for the Latin American region, 
there are several analyses at the state level for Mexico (Madrazo Rojas, 2009; Ashby and 
Ramos, 2013; Ramos and Ashby, 2013) and at the firm level for Colombia (Pshisva and 
Suarez, 2010).  
Using data on organised crime from the World Economic Forum for 19 Latin American 
countries between 2002 and 2010, Gomez Soler (2012) finds there is no significant 
correlation between crime and aggregate FDI. Analyses that focus on Mexico and use state 
level data show that crime has a negative effect on FDI. Madrazo Rojas (2009) finds that 
homicide rates have a negative effect on FDI when using total FDI at the state level between 
1998 and 2006 from Mexico. Ashby and Ramos (2013) expand on Madrazo Rojas’ (2009) 
approach by studying the impact of homicide rates on FDI in different sectors. They find that 
crime has a negative effect on FDI in the agriculture, commerce and financial services 
sectors, but a positive effect in the oil and mining sectors. They also find that crime has no 
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effect on the manufacturing sector. Ramos and Ashby (2013) expand on this work by 
showing that high crime rates do not deter investment from high-crime countries into Mexico.  
In a related vein of research, Pshisva and Suarez (2010) use firm level data for Colombia 
and document that crime (in the form of kidnappings) targeted at firm owners has a negative 
effect on investment. However, overall violent crime appears to have an insignificant impact. 
In their exploratory analysis, Pshisva and Suarez (2010) also consider aggregate FDI and do 
find a negative impact of kidnappings on net foreign direct investment for 196 countries. 
Other analyses on the effect of crime on FDI for other countries outside Latin America show 
also a negative effect of crime on FDI.5 The question remains as to why and how would FDI 
be impacted by crime. Looking at aggregates may confound the different dynamics occurring 
in different sectors. For example, one might hypothesise that crime should not be as 
detrimental in the primary sector and that, instead, armed conflict might be a more important 
explanation for natural resource driven investment. Thus the impact of crime clearly becomes 
an empirical question. 
Our paper is distinct from the above literature in four broad ways. The obvious 
distinction is that we take into account the interplay between institutions and crime, therefore 
addressing not only the potential problems of omitted variable bias, but also the paradox 
described above in the introduction (better institutions but also increasing levels of crime). 
Second, we are studying flows of FDI into a single region, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The vast majority of the literature on FDI is concerned with the overall flows of FDI into a 
host country or a relatively large number of countries. Third, and most important, our paper 
presents a decomposition of the overall flows into three broad sectors. We argue that moving 
forward, the studies of the determinants of FDI into developing countries needs to focus on 
sectorial differences. Fourth, our analysis uses three different indicators related to crime, 
which allows us to capture different dimensions of crime and provide new insights on the 
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crime-FDI link. As outlined above, our paper falls into the broader literature on FDI in Latin 
America by combining these aspects in a unique way. The following section details the 
methodology and data used in the analysis. 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
For our investigation on the impact of institutions and crime on FDI we specify our model as 
follows: 
ܨܦܫ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߚଵܥݎ݅݉݁௜,௧ ∗ ∑ ܵ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௝ ൅௞௝ ߚଶܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ∗ ∑ ܵ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௝ ൅௞௝ ௜ܺ,௧′ ߜ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧    (1) 
In Equation 1, the dependent variable is the natural log of a country’s FDI inflow as share 
of GDP in country i, sector j, and period t.6 Xi,t represents standard control variables in the 
literature and εi,j,t represents the error terms for country i and sector j, in period t. Our 
coefficients of interest are ߚଵ and ߚଶ where we interact the crime variables and institutional 
variables with sectoral dummies. This approach follows a similar method as the ones used by 
Ashby and Ramos (2013) and Dadzie et al. (2014) who both looked at the impacts of crime 
on investment (domestic and international into a single country). Since we want to understand 
sectoral dynamics, the interactions are important in allowing us to interpret the effect of these 
variables in the different sectors more accurately.7  
We use sectoral FDI for the 1996-2010 period for 18 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries for which we were able to get data on sectoral FDI and crime (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela). 
FDI data is disaggregated into primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, and sectoral data was 
obtained from UNCTAD/DITE (2013). Our estimations are based on an unbalanced panel 
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data since many of the variables are not available at all times for all countries during the 
period of analysis.8 The control variables considered here are those commonly included in 
FDI models: the initial level of real GDP per capita, total population, trade openness, 
exchange rate, and inflation (all variables in natural logs). Data for these variables was 
obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). For robustness we 
also consider other variables such as surrounding market potential, capital openness, and 
polity.9 The accompanying notes in Table A1 in the Appendix, which includes the summary 
statistics for all the variables used in our estimations, also includes a description of variable 
definitions, methodological aspects and relevant transformation. 
We consider three crime variables: homicide rates, a crime victimization index, and an 
organised crime index. Homicide rates are obtained from the United Nations Surveys on 
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN, 2014). We construct a 
crime victimization index using survey data from the Latinobarometro. Our crime 
victimization index represents the proportion of the population who has been themselves, or 
their relatives, victims of a crime. We also include in the model an organised crime index, 
which is provided by the World Economic Forum (2014). In its original form, the organised 
crime index is constructed with values of 1-7, where higher values represent fewer problems 
with organised crime. In order to make all out estimates consistent, we re-define this variable 
by multiplying it by minus one. Thus our estimated reports indicate that higher values of the 
index represent more problems with organised crime. We take the natural log of homicides 
and crime victimization since the distribution of these variables is skewed towards the right 
(the mean is greater than median). We do not use the log of organised crime not only because 
this variable is always negative, but also because it does not show a skewed distribution 
towards the right.  
  13
For the institutional variables, we first construct an indicator of governance related to 
institutions that are important for business. For this indicator we use the principal component 
of bureaucratic quality, control of corruption, and law and order. We also consider in our 
model other variables provided by the International Country Risk Guide Dataset (ICRG, 
Political Risk Services, 2013), such as the composite risk index. Table 1 presents the 
components of the composite risk measure. We also explore with the political risk index and 
its components since our emphasis is on institutions. We include each institutional variable 
that composes the political risk index at the time interacted with the sector dummies to avoid 
problems of multicolinearity. The results section only presents the results of those estimations 
for which we find that the interaction between the institutional variable from the political risk 
index and sector dummy are significant. We note that institutional variables from this dataset 
with higher values represent higher institutional quality (for example, higher values mean 
higher bureaucratic quality and law and order and less corruption). 
Our analysis is based on a fixed effects model with robust standard errors for all three 
sectors (18 countries). Instead of estimating our model by sectors, the data is stacked (i.e. 
pooled for the different sectors for each country) as in that way we are able to increase the 
number of observations and increase our sample size. The UNCTAD FDI sectoral data is not 
consistently available over time and running a regression for each sector would result in a 
very small number of observations. Finally, we also include time dummies in all our 
estimations (since they are found to be significant as a group with an F test in all regressions).  
Note that, in Equation 1, we use lags of all variables in the right hand side to avoid problems 
of endogeneity.10 
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IV. Results 
Table 2 displays the correlation matrix between the crime variables and institutional 
variables. As previously suggested in our discussion of the literature, crime is likely to be 
correlated to the institutional environment of a country. This table shows that the correlations 
of institutional variables with crime variables are relatively high, especially for the 
institutional variables related to governance and law and order. Not surprisingly, these 
correlations also depend on the type of crime. For example, crime, as measured by homicides, 
is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with governance (-0.55), law and order 
(-0.63) and socioeconomic conditions (-0.41). Crime victimization has the highest 
correlations with military in politics (-0.20) and internal conflict (-0.16). Finally, organised 
crime has significant correlations with law and order (0.73), governance (0.53), internal 
conflict (0.42) and political risk (0.38). Thus, the high correlation between institutional and 
crime variables might leads us to hypothesise that one of the channels through which 
institutions have an effect on FDI could be through the interplay between institutions and 
crime, an association that has not been explored in previous literature. For this reason, we 
first focus on the impact of the institutional variables on FDI alone and then we incorporate 
crime variables in the model. 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating the model indicated in Equation 1. Column 1 
explores the importance of governance for FDI inflows and, therefore, omits any form of 
crime interactions. We interact governance by sector of the economy in order to understand 
the differential impacts it has on FDI. Governance seems to play a positive role on FDI 
inflows although the interaction turns out to be only marginally significant (10 percent) for 
the primary sector (Column1). Columns 2, 3 and 4 include, in addition to the sectoral 
interactions with governance, the sectoral interactions with crime as represented by homicide, 
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crime victimization and the organised crime index, respectively. In this case, any remaining 
significance of the governance variable disappears. Instead, we observe that crime 
victimization has a significant negative impact in the tertiary sector at the 5 percent level, and 
a marginally significant negative effect in the secondary (Column 3). The homicide rate and 
organised crime index only show a significant negative impact on the secondary sector 
(Column 2) and tertiary sectors (Column 4), respectively. This suggests that the more 
individual-focused measures of crime (homicides) correlates more strongly with decreased 
FDI in the manufacturing sector while the more impersonal (organised crime) matters more 
for the service sector. Columns 5, 6 and 7 in Table 3 show the results when we exclude the 
governance indicator from these models. The results validate our previous estimates. The 
only difference is that when we exclude the governance indicator, crime victimization has a 
significant negative effect at the 5 percent level in the secondary sector instead of being 
marginally significant (column 3 versus column 7, Table 3). Interestingly, the size of the 
coefficients for our crime variables for the tertiary sector in columns 6 and 7 are relatively 
larger than the ones shown in columns 3 and 4, respectively. This finding suggests that the 
significant crime variables are also able to pick up some of the effect that institutions have on 
FDI. However, the change on the coefficients of the crime variables might also be the result 
of multicolinearity between the governance index and, in particular, with the organised crime 
variable. We note that since the governance variable is a composite index that contains 
bureaucratic quality, control of corruption and law and order, the former likely reflects 
partially the trends in crime.11 We will discuss the issue of multicolinearity further in the 
robustness section and estimate alternative models that deal with this possibility. 
Table 4 shows the results when we include in the model the composite risk index 
(columns 1-4) and the political risk index (columns 5-8) separately. As discussed above, the 
political risk index is one of the components of the composite risk index (see Table 1) and we 
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include one crime variable at the time in the estimations. We find that when the composite 
risk index and the political risk index are included without the crime variables (columns 1 and 
5), these indices are positive and statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent level for FDI 
in the tertiary sector. When the crime variables are added to the estimation together with the 
composite and political risk indices, crime turns out to be significant (in some cases) but the 
significance of the institutional indices for the tertiary sector disappears. This is a similar 
finding to what we obtained when the governance indicator with the crime variables were 
included in the model in Table 3, but the significance of the governance indicator was only 
marginal in the model without the crime variables.  
When comparing results in Table 4 with results in Table 3, specifically with the results 
shown for the model that excludes the governance index (columns 5-7 in Table 3) we observe 
that homicides rates have a significant effect on FDI in the secondary sector when we include 
them with the composite and political risk indices (columns 2 and 6), while crime 
victimization continues to show a negative significant effect at the 5 percent level on FDI in 
the secondary and tertiary sector (columns 3 and 7, where crime victimization has marginal 
significance when including the political risk index). When we add the index of organised 
crime (columns 4 and 8), we continue to observe that organised crime affects FDI in the 
tertiary sector.  
We tested for the impact of all of the institutional variables that compose the political risk 
index on FDI (see Table 1 for details on the components of the index), without including the 
crime variables first. We show in Tables 5 and 6 the estimates of our model for the cases in 
which the variables from the political risk index were found to be significant. These 
estimations showed that of those variables, corruption, government stability, internal conflict 
and investment profile were the only ones to be statistically significant for FDI in the 
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secondary and tertiary sector at least at the 5 percent level. Table 5 includes the estimates 
from the models that include the corruption and government stability variables, and Table 6 
includes the estimations for the models that include the internal conflict and investment 
profile variables. Table 5 shows that when we include the corruption variable, this seems to 
matter for the primary sector while government stability has a significant positive coefficient 
for FDI in the tertiary sector (columns 1 and 5). Similar to the results documented with the 
other institutional variables in Table 4, the significance of the institutional variables goes 
away when the crime variables are added to the model. Estimates in Table 5 show that when 
crime victimization and organised crime are included in the model with corruption (columns 
3 and 4) and government stability (columns 7 and 8), crime continues to have a significant 
negative effect in the tertiary sector in both cases. Homicide continues to have a negative 
significant coefficient for FDI in the secondary sector (columns 2 and 6). Crime victimization 
has a significant negative effect at the 5 percent level when we include it with corruption, but 
it becomes marginally significant when we include this variable with government stability 
(columns 3 and 7). 
The results in Table 6, which include estimates from the model that takes into account 
internal conflict (columns 1-4) and investment profile (columns 5-8) separately, are very 
similar to what we found before. When including internal conflict in the model and 
investment profile by themselves (columns 1 and 5), we find that lower internal conflict and 
higher investment profile are associated with greater FDI in the tertiary sector (recall that 
higher values of these variables represent better political and institutional environments). In 
columns 2-4, where we add the crime variables to the model with internal conflict, we 
continue to observe that crime victimization and organised crime have a significant impact on 
FDI in the tertiary sector, but the internal conflict variable is no longer significant. In columns 
6-8, we include the crime variables in the model with investment profile and, once again, we 
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observe that crime victimization and organised crime have a significant negative impact on 
FDI in the tertiary sector. In both cases, when we include internal conflict and the investment 
profile with the homicide rate variable in the model (Table 6, columns 2 and 6), we find once 
again that it is homicide the variable that has a significant negative effect on FDI in the 
secondary sector. Crime victimization has a marginal significant negative effect when we 
include it with internal conflict and investment profile (columns 3 and 7, Table 6) 
Before we move into the discussion of the robustness checks used in this analysis, we 
summarise here the main findings. First, we find that there is a correlation between 
institutional and crime variables, which is important to keep in mind when we have a model 
where institutional and crime variables are accounted for at the same time. Second, we 
observe that there are several institutional variables that have a significant effect on FDI in 
the tertiary sector but no effect in other sectors when we include them in the model without 
the crime variables. Third, in most cases we observe that when crime variables are added to 
the model, the significance of the institutional variables disappears. This finding is supportive 
of the important interconnection between institutions and crime. Fourth, we find that crime 
victimization and organised crime have a robust significant negative effect on FDI in the 
tertiary sector and the homicide rate has a significant negative effect in the secondary sector. 
Thus, an important implication of our findings is that, when analysing the impact of crime on 
FDI, it is important to use alternative measures of crime and not just focus on the most 
commonly used indicator (homicide rates). Moreover, as the quality of data improves over 
time, using disaggregated data by sector (and even firm specific data) should be the direction 
of future research on FDI in developing countries. While there may be global drivers of FDI, 
each sector has its own idiosyncrasies which need to be assessed and accounted for. 
Originally, we were cautious in hypothesizing what results should be expected at the sectoral 
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level but, in hindsight, crime should logically be a deterrent mainly for investment in the 
secondary and tertiary sector. Also, the type of crime should matter.  
V. Robustness Tests 
We tested for the robustness of our results by using the following strategies: 1) we use 
FDI inflows instead of FDI as a share of GDP, 2) we followed the previous strategy where we 
use FDI as a share of GDP as our dependent variable but include in the model only data that 
has not been interpolated (see Table A1 for more details), 3) we examine additional control 
variables to account for the possibility of omitted variable bias (surrounding market potential, 
capital openness and polity) to the baseline model with each crime variable included one at 
the time. All of our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we change estimation 
strategies suggesting that the findings presented above are robust to the specification changes 
we employed. Overall, the conclusion that the crime victimization and organised crime 
variables have a significant effect on FDI in the tertiary sector and homicides on the 
secondary sector, is maintained throughout all these estimations. 
For robustness purposes, we also explore further the issue of multicolinearity. We 
performed a multicolinearity test for the models estimated in Table 4, columns 2-4, which 
include the governance indicator and the crime variables one at the time. The results of the 
test show that the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are greater than 10 for crime victimization 
and organised crime. For some of the control variables, as we expected, we also find that VIF 
are greater than 10 (i.e. for initial GDP, population, and trade). This is not uncommon with 
aggregate data but to identify whether multicolinearity problems are severe, we estimate the 
models shown in columns 5-7 of Table 4, without the control variables that showed high VIF. 
We do not observe loss of significance or changes of signs in the reduced models and find 
that crime victimization and organised crime continue to have a significant negative effect on 
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FDI in the tertiary sector and homicides continues to have a significant negative effect on the 
secondary sector. Thus, we conclude that while inclusion of the variables discussed above 
may introduce some multicolinearity in the estimations presented in Table 4, it is not severe 
enough to qualitatively change our results.  
 We also estimate our model including only Latin American countries. One could argue 
that there is a significant difference between Latin American and Caribbean countries, and for 
these reasons we estimate all the models shown in Tables 4-5 excluding the Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix show a 
selected set of estimates for the models estimated with the reduced sample.12 Our previous 
results for the full sample are robust to using a reduced sample that includes only Latin 
American countries suggesting that the results are not driven by the Caribbean countries. 
A final methodological consideration has to do with the fact that the literature on FDI has 
recently become more concerned with the presence spatial correlations (Blanco, 2012). It is 
worth noting that in our initial exploration of the data, we estimated the model separately for 
each sector and we did not find evidence of spatial interdependence. In our taken approach, 
looking at spatial correlation was not feasible as our methodological approach relies on 
stacking the sectoral FDI data and including sector-specific dummies. This does not allow for 
the introduction of a term that controls for spatial autocorrelation. Overall, we believe our 
approach is appropriate in this case because using the stacked data helps us to better account 
for the differential effect of crime and institutional variables on FDI. 
VI. Conclusion 
It has long been recognised that FDI has been a motor for economic development in middle 
and low-income countries. Latin America has benefited in many ways from these inflows and 
therefore, not only academics but also policy makers have sustained a quest to investigate, 
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determine and discern the drivers and determinants of FDI into the region. Of particular 
importance has been the role of institutions and its interplay with crime. While Latin 
American countries have made great advances in terms of institutional improvements, the 
region still remains as one of the most violent regions in the world. 
In this paper, we study the impact of crime and institutions on foreign direct 
investment to Latin America. We pay particular attention to the interplay between crime and 
institutions. We find that there is correlation between the institutional and crime variables, 
where the significance of institutional variables tends to disappear when the crime variables 
are added to the model. In particular, we explore three different variables related to violent 
crime (homicides, crime victimization, and an organised crime index), and find crime 
victimization and the organised crime index to be statistically significant in most estimations 
for the tertiary sector, where increases in both measures of crime are associated with lower 
FDI in that sector. We also find that, in addition to crime victimization, higher homicides 
rates are associated with lower FDI in the secondary sector. This leads to an unfortunate 
conclusion. The transition to democratic government in the region over the last 25 years has 
led to significant improvements in institutional quality. Ceteris paribus, these improvements 
should have led to higher levels of FDI. However, our results indicate that the surge in crime 
in the region could work against the positive effects that better institutions have on FDI 
inflows in the region. Our results therefore point to another important reason for decreasing 
crime, and increasing efforts to make crime reduction an important matter of public policy. 
The analysis in this paper also provides important insights related to the motivations 
of FDI and the importance of conducting sectoral analysis. We did not find a significant 
impact of crime on FDI in the primary sector. This was expected as FDI in the primary sector 
is largely motivated by the availability of natural resources in a specific country. Therefore, 
we might expect firms to be less sensitive to crime and our results corroborate this. The 
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results were somewhat less consistent with FDI in the secondary sector. We found that only 
when we consider homicide rates and crime victimization, crime has a significant negative 
effect on FDI in the secondary sector, but this was not the case when we considered organised 
crime. FDI in the secondary sector is motivated by cost advantages in the form of low labour 
costs and investment is also motivated with the purpose of serving the global market. From 
our findings, we could hypothesise that when firms chose to invest in the secondary sector in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the rate of return is potentially high enough to offset some 
of the costs derived from crime. Our hypothesis here is that homicides rates, which reflect the 
most violent form of crime might influence the perceptions of production cost in the 
secondary sector and ultimately affect FDI in this sector. In the tertiary sector, firms are 
motivated in general, to invest with the purpose of serving that specific market. Investment in 
this sector is associated with tourism, education, financial services, real estate, among others. 
Thus, the impact of crime is likely to affect strongly the tertiary sector, which is what our 
analysis shows when we consider crime victimization and organised crime. Our hypothesis 
here is that crime victimization and organised crime might reflect better how crime affects 
individual behaviour, and therefore their consumption patterns. Thus, our analysis indicates 
that lower levels of FDI in the tertiary sector are to be expected if crime continues to be at 
such high levels in this region. Unfortunately, the persistence of crime would tend to make 
development in this sector slower than would otherwise be possible. 
To develop a deeper understanding of the interconnection of institutions and crime for 
capital flows, further research at the firm level that focuses on the motivations of FDI is 
warranted. Data collected through interviews with top managers of multinational enterprises 
could provide important insights on how institutional deficiencies and high crime rates affects 
investment decision, and whether they will be discouraged by these environments or 
accommodate for these deficiencies. Previous experience in a specific country is likely to 
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play a role mitigating some of the detrimental effects of low institutional quality and crime, 
and this could be studied with firm level data.   
 
Endnotes
                                                            
1 For general determinants, see Tumman and Emmert (2003), Trevino and Mixon (2004), 
Ferraz et al. (2011), and Reyes and Sawyer (2011), among others. 
2 Bertola (2011) offers an interesting historical account of the roots of institutions in Latin 
America. 
3 See Daude and Stein (2007), Schulz (2009) and Ali et al. (2010) for a summary of this 
literature, and Fukumi and Nishjima (2010) and Penfold (2014) for evidence on the link 
between institutions and FDI in Latin America. 
4 Martin and Bell (2006) and Chudnovsky, et al. (2008) have shown this to be the case for 
Argentina. Waldkirch, et al. (2009) present evidence on the positive effect of FDI on 
employment in Mexico. 
5 In fact, there is not much on the relationship between crime and FDI in general. Apart of the 
above described papers, a few of the papers have been done at the regional level for Italy 
(Daniel and Marani, 2011) and country level for Russia (Brock 1998). 
6 For robustness purposes, we also estimated our model using total FDI inflows instead of 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP. As discussed in the robustness section, the results supported 
our conclusions. 
7 Note that we do not include crime and institutions as variables on their own. This follows 
the recommendations by Yip and Tsang (2007). Since we use stacked data the interpretation 
of the results are better understood through the interactions. We control for sector 
characteristics by using panel data techniques. 
8 For the FDI variables we used linear interpolation to fill in for missing observations. Details 
on the process of interpolation are presented in the accompanying notes of table A.1 in the 
appendix.     
9 For more detail on the importance of capital openness, see Agosin and Machado (2007). 
10 All variables are entered as lags except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year 
period). Using the initial level of GDP per capita is important because our dependent variable 
is FDI as a share of GDP, which help us dealing with the issue of having GDP in both sides of 
the equation in the same form. 
11 The “law” element in “law and order” assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system. The “order” element refers to a “popular observance of the law” (Political Risk 
Services, 2013).  As explained by the ICRG, a country with a good judicial system may 
receive a high score but this is lowered if there is a high perception of crime (they cite 
widespread legal strikes). So while it does capture the “crime” aspect, the direct impact 
cannot be readily assessed. Our crime measures are akin to a “de Facto” measure of crime and 
are therefore a better indicator of its impact. 
12 Results for all estimations shown in Tables 4-7 for the reduced sample are available upon 
request. 
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Table 1. Components of the Composite Risk Index 
    
GDP per head 
  Real GDP growth 
 Economic Risk Annual inflation rate 
  Budget balance as a percentage of GDP 
  Current account as a percentage of GDP 
Foreign debt as a percentage of GDP 
  Foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services  
 Financial Risk Current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services 
  Net international liquidity as months of import cover  
  Exchange rate stability 
Government stability 
  Socioeconomic conditions 
  Investment profile 
  Internal conflict 
  External conflict 
 Political Risk Corruption 
  Military in politics 
  Religious tensions 
  Law and order 
  Ethnic tensions 
  Democratic accountability 
  Bureaucracy quality 
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Table 2. Correlations 
Homicide 
rate 
Crime 
victimization 
Organised 
crime 
Homicide rate 1.0000 0.0598 0.6672* 
Crime victimization 0.0598 1.0000 0.2528* 
Governance -0.5583* 0.0660 -0.5326* 
Composite risk -0.2818* -0.0840* -0.2992* 
Political risk -0.3945* -0.0922* -0.3810* 
Bureaucratic quality -0.1577* 0.1259* -0.0232 
Corruption -0.2934* 0.1097* -0.3072* 
Democracy -0.3721* -0.0812* -0.2970* 
Ethnic tension 0.1353* -0.1463* 0.0197 
External conflict -0.0316 0.0404 0.038 
Government stability 0.0927* 0.1099* 0.1536* 
Internal conflict -0.2353* -0.1636* -0.4198* 
Investment profile -0.1584* -0.1262* -0.1550* 
Law and order -0.6396* -0.053 -0.7265* 
Military in politics -0.3048* -0.2025* -0.2562* 
Religion in politics -0.1214* 0.0984* -0.0818 
Socioeconomic cond. -0.4157* -0.0433 -0.3297* 
Correlations between the crime variables and the institutional variables and between the crime variables 
themselves. (*) Represents statistical significance at least at the 5 percent level. Use natural logarithm for 
homicide rate and crime victimization.  
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Table 3. Model with governance indicator and crime variables
 Dep Var: FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance * Prim Sector 0.4354* 0.4620* 0.1922 0.3774 
(0.2559) (0.2576) (0.2099) (0.2780) 
Governance * Secondary Sec -0.0607 -0.1346 -0.2341 0.1494 
(0.1437) (0.1615) (0.1774) (0.1734) 
Governance * Tertiary Sector 0.2536 -0.0348 -0.0676 -0.1986 
(0.2579) (0.2130) (0.2381) (0.2418) 
Ln(Crime) * Primary Sector 0.4144 -0.4573 -0.3357 0.0820 -0.3893 -0.3333 
(0.4860) (0.6791) (0.4660) (0.4598) (0.6698) (0.4581) 
Ln(Crime) * Secondary Sector -0.6046** -0.8364* -0.1200 -0.5337** -0.9057** -0.1253 
(0.2395) (0.4312) (0.1845) (0.2404) (0.4459) (0.1839) 
Ln(Crime) * Tertiary Sector 0.2257 -1.1062** -0.4705*** 0.3201 -1.1274** -0.4835*** 
(0.4169) (0.4750) (0.1584) (0.3715) (0.4274) (0.1673) 
(0.8664) (0.9370) (1.2457) (1.6755) (1.0372) (1.2343) (1.6640) 
Constant -22.4079 -75.047 -78.4308 -147.4074 -80.8826 -78.269 -153.9414 
(42.4791) (52.1586) (48.9377) (96.2909) (55.9210) (50.2772) (101.9239) 
Controls               
Time FE               
R-squared 0.2588 0.086 0.0989 0.1274 0.0645 0.0902 0.1192 
Observations 951 486 513 342 486 513 342 
Number of groups 52 49 43 48 49 43 48 
Obs. per group, min. 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 
Obs. per group, max 26 15 15 9 15 15 9 
Obs. per group, avg. 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 9.918 11.93 7.125 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimations derived from the model 
including homicide rates shown in columns 2 and 5, including crime victimization index shown in columns 3 and 6, and including organised crime index in 
columns 4 and 7. Fixed Effects model used in all estimations. Control variables are GDPpc, population, trade openness, exchange rates and, inflation. All 
variables are entered as lags except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year period). 
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Table 4. Model with composite and political risk indices and crime variables 
  Dep Var: FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk * Prim Sec 0.0341 -0.0018 0.0185 0.0472 0.019 0.0441 0.0547 0.0554 
(0.0250) (0.0304) (0.0292) (0.0556) (0.0265) (0.0462) (0.0331) (0.0457) 
Risk * Sec Sec 0.0159 -0.0413 -0.0361 -0.0124 0.0022 -0.0386 -0.0263 0.0096 
(0.0188) (0.0332) (0.0282) (0.0349) (0.0148) (0.0260) (0.0232) (0.0356) 
Risk * Ter Sec 0.0573*** -0.0024 0.0051 0.0049 0.0430** -0.0059 0.0087 0.0233 
(0.0194) (0.0180) (0.0214) (0.0312) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0253) (0.0310) 
Ln(Crime) * Prim Sec 0.0756 -0.3808 -0.3597 0.2579 -0.4826 -0.3861 
  (0.4565) (0.6918) (0.4754)  (0.5290) (0.7170) (0.4598) 
Ln(Crime) * Sec Sec -0.5394** -0.9896** -0.1395 -0.5493** -0.8266* -0.1126 
(0.2356) (0.4193) (0.1934) (0.2313) (0.4275) (0.1774) 
Ln(Crime) * Ter Sec 0.3154 -1.1301*** -0.5028*** 0.3227 -1.1281** -0.4962*** 
(0.3721) (0.4004) (0.1593) (0.3666) (0.4538) (0.1689) 
Constant -22.0488 -94.1629 -83.2166 -147.7054 -22.4555 -88.0652 -83.1827* -183.9376* 
(43.0743) (61.0375) (53.4288) (96.6263) (43.8346) (56.1365) (45.3810) (107.9696) 
Controls                  
Time FE                 
R-squared 0.2679 0.0727 0.0987 0.1275 0.2579 0.0808 0.1114 0.1262 
Observations 951 486 513 342 951 486 513 342
Number of groups 52 49 43 48 52 49 43 48 
Obs. per group, min. 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
Obs. per group, max 26 15 15 9 26 15 15 9 
Obs. per group, avg. 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimations derived from the model 
including homicide rates shown in columns 2 and 6, including crime victimization index shown in columns 3 and 7, and including organised crime index in 
columns 4 and 8. Estimations derived from the model including the composite risk index shown in columns 1-4 and including the political risk index in 
columns 5-8. Fixed Effects model used in all estimations. Control variables are GDPpc, population, trade openness, exchange rates and, inflation. All 
variables are entered as lags except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year period). 
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Table 5. Model with corruption and government stability (components of the political risk index) and crime variables 
  Dep Var: FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pol risk var * Prim Sec 0.4373** 0.1403 0.0754 -0.0215 0.1211 -0.0389 0.017 0.0249 
(0.1908) (0.1838) (0.1730) (0.1010) (0.0858) (0.0847) (0.1155) (0.0793) 
Pol risk var * Sec Sec 0.0327 -0.1168 -0.0942 0.0889 0.0359 -0.0879 -0.0538 0.0071 
(0.1589) (0.1256) (0.1037) (0.1593) (0.0654) (0.0686) (0.0641) (0.0769) 
Pol risk var * Ter Sec 0.0348 -0.141 -0.1075 -0.2263 0.1807** -0.0159 -0.0195 0.0204 
(0.2332) (0.1376) (0.1836) (0.1712) (0.0788) (0.0628) (0.0812) (0.0650) 
Ln(Crime) * Prim Sec 0.2078 -0.4395 -0.3344 0.1002 -0.4656 -0.355 
  (0.4787) (0.6750) (0.4559) (0.4675) (0.7171) (0.4469)
Ln(Crime) * Sec Sec -0.5940** -0.8824** -0.1431 -0.6095*** -0.8532* -0.1292 
(0.2305) (0.4221) (0.1725) (0.2176) (0.4402) (0.1736) 
Ln(Crime) * Ter Sec 0.2174 -1.0451** -0.4413** 0.3598 -1.1229** -0.5017*** 
(0.3935) (0.4652) (0.1688) (0.3684) (0.4479) (0.1763) 
Controls                 
Time FE                 
Constant -27.3145 -77.479 -75.2219 -149.1302 -27.9968 -72.6432 -76.0841 -155.7352 
(38.2716) (52.3888) (48.4299) (101.0115) (43.9298) (56.6669) (50.7307) (102.9602) 
R-squared 0.257 0.0756 0.0945 0.1237 0.2572 0.0702 0.0929 0.1196 
Observations 951 486 513 342 951 486 513 342 
Number of groups 52 49 43 48 52 49 43 48 
Obs. per group, min. 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
Obs. per group, max 26 15 15 9 26 15 15 9 
Obs. per group, avg. 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimations derived from the model 
including corruption shown in columns 1-4 and using government stability shown in columns 5-8. Estimations derived from the model including homicide 
rates shown in columns 2 and 6, including crime victimization index shown in columns 3 and 7, and including organised crime index in columns 4 and 8. 
Fixed Effects model used in all estimations. Control variables are GDPpc, population, trade openness, exchange rates and, inflation. All variables are 
entered as lags except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year period). 
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Table 6. Model with internal conflict and investment profile (components of the political risk index) and crime variables.  
  Dep Var: FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pol risk var * Prim Sec 0.0413 -0.0162 0.1102 0.0233 0.0168 0.0016 0.1025 0.1364 
(0.0743) (0.0910) (0.0753) (0.1594) (0.0894) (0.1139) (0.0886) (0.1156) 
Pol risk var * Sec Sec 0.0537 0.0234 0.0762 -0.0178 -0.0109 -0.0668 -0.0263 0.0221 
(0.0530) (0.1295) (0.0741) (0.1400) (0.0494) (0.0629) (0.0533) (0.0633) 
Pol risk var * Ter Sec 0.1517** -0.0443 0.0921 0.0132 0.1603*** 0.0472 0.0703 0.1049** 
(0.0619) (0.0737) (0.0625) (0.0981) (0.0469) (0.0454) (0.0419) (0.0435) 
Ln(Crime) * Prim Sec 0.0769 -0.3138 -0.3408 0.0737 -0.5125 -0.3209 
  (0.4669) (0.7063) (0.4641)  (0.4659) (0.7286) (0.4456) 
Ln(Crime) * Sec Sec -0.5648** -0.8928* -0.1235 -0.5437** -0.8517* -0.073 
(0.2485) (0.4608) (0.1834) (0.2308) (0.4595) (0.1879) 
Ln(Crime) * Ter Sec 0.3194 -1.0581** -0.4880*** 0.3057 -1.2163*** -0.4559** 
(0.3796) (0.4024) (0.1677) (0.3711) (0.4099) (0.1842) 
Controls                 
Time FE                 
Constant -14.992 -83.8108 -55.7941 -154.64 -25.636 -83.7721 -88.2122* -210.2772** 
(44.9366) (62.5242) (54.3212) (102.7329) (44.9393) (57.9035) (45.3673) (102.9218) 
R-squared 0.2504 0.0654 0.0984 0.1194 0.2565 0.0696 0.1025 0.1305 
Observations 951 486 513 342 951 486 513 342 
Number of groups 52 49 43 48 52 49 43 48
Obs. per group, min. 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
Obs. per group, max 26 15 15 9 26 15 15 9 
Obs. per group, avg. 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 18.29 9.918 11.93 7.125 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimations derived from the model 
including internal conflict shown in columns 1-4 and using investment profile shown in columns 5-8. Estimations derived from the model including homicide 
rates shown in columns 2 and 6, including crime victimization index shown in columns 3 and 7, and including organised crime index in columns 4 and 8. Fixed 
Effects model used in all estimations. Control variables are GDPpc, population, trade openness, exchange rates and, inflation. All variables are entered as lags 
except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year period). 
   
  34
Appendix 
Table A1. Summary Statistics         
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Levels 
FDI GDP share (160) a, b, c 1134 0.8588 1.3446 0.0000 16.5152 
FDI inflow (160) b 1134 238.0611 416.7552 0.0000 7022.6000 
GDP per capita initiald 1599 3560.6580 2220.2920 833.8649 14297.8900 
Population 1674 24300000 39500000 1069199 193000000 
Trade openness (12) b 1635 64.2583 40.8049 11.5457 562.0604 
Exchange rate 1665 615.7166 2933.8790 0.0000 25000.0000 
Inflation (15) b, c 1665 146.6854 936.6053 -27.6317 13611.6300 
Homicide rate 663 25.1210 22.3102 3.2000 139.1321 
Crime victimization (90) b 669 0.3865 0.0964 0.1188 0.7824 
Organised crime 465 -3.8694 0.9689 -6.2781 -1.8000 
Governance 1404 0.0809 1.0215 -2.4956 2.4671 
Composite risk 1404 62.5685 10.8940 25.3800 82.3800 
Political risk 1404 61.3277 10.6323 29.5000 81.7500 
Bureaucratic quality 1404 1.8118 0.8632 0.0000 3.0000 
Corruption 1404 2.7310 0.9564 0.0000 5.0000 
Democracy 1404 3.9379 1.1537 1.0000 6.0000 
Ethnic tension 1404 4.5567 1.1366 0.5000 6.0000 
External conflict 1404 9.9808 2.0278 2.0000 12.0000 
Government stability 1404 6.9728 1.9560 2.0000 11.0000 
Internal conflict 1404 8.2023 2.3806 0.0000 12.0000 
Investment profile 1404 6.7265 2.2496 1.1700 11.5000 
Law and order 1404 2.8828 1.0695 1.0000 5.0000 
Military in politics 1404 3.3827 1.5641 0.0000 6.0000 
Religion in politics 1404 5.1860 0.6819 4.0000 6.0000 
Socioeconomic conditions 1404 5.1654 1.4771 1.0000 8.5000 
Capital openness e 1674 0.0938 1.5508 -1.8640 2.4390 
Surrounding mkt. pot. e 1674 3333.1910 672.1175 2116.4440 6019.4790 
Polity e 1581 5.9696 4.6597 -9.0000 10.0000 
Natural logarithm 
Ln(FDI GDP share) 1134 -1.1871 1.6439 -6.9078 2.8043 
Ln(FDI inflow) 1134 4.2418 1.8611 -2.9957 8.8569 
Ln(GDP per capita initial) 1599 7.9847 0.6396 6.7261 9.5679 
Ln(Population) 1674 16.1277 1.2689 13.8824 19.0807 
Ln(Trade openness) 1635 4.0024 0.5748 2.4463 6.3316 
Ln(Exchange rate) 1665 1.0110 5.9610 -25.1748 10.1266 
Ln(Inflation) 1665 2.4478 1.7780 -1.7749 9.5187 
Ln(Homicide rate) 663 2.8779 0.8343 1.1632 4.9354 
Ln(Crime victimization)f 669 -0.9812 0.2507 -2.1301 -0.2454 
Ln(Surrounding mkt. pot). 1674 8.0923 0.1953 7.6575 8.7028 
Notes: 
Methodological considerations and variable transformations:  
(a) Some of the values for FDI inflows are non-positive (5 cases). The natural logarithm transformation for those values is equal to 
the natural logarithm of half the minimum value among observations in the sample greater than zero. This is the form of 
truncation recommended by Cameron and Trivedi (2005).  
(b) We use linear interpolation for the variables. In parenthesis we denote the number of observations filled in with linear 
interpolation. Due to missing observations in the FDI data, we also use linear interpolation for our dependent variable. After 
filling in for missing data in this way, we find that 14 percent of the total number of observations used in the analysis were 
created by linear interpolation, which is a reasonable percentage. We are aware that using this amount of interpolated data is 
likely to understate reported standard which is why we estimate our model in the robustness section using the FDI data without 
linear interpolation (see robustness section). 
(c) Summary statistics for all variables but FDI are using the first lag. The natural logarithm for the non-positive values (FDI and 
Inflation) are truncated with the natural logarithm of half the minimum positive value.  
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(d) For initial GDP per capita we use real GDP in 2000 constant US dollars. This variable is time variant as it is initial level a five 
year period. Trade openness is exports plus imports as a share of GDP and the exchange rate variable is the official exchange 
rate, where it is expressed as the number of local currency units per US dollar. 
(e) We construct surrounding market potential as in Blanco (2012). Capital openness data is obtained from Chinn and Ito (2008), 
and polity data from the polity IV database (Marshall and Jagger, 2013).  
(f) There is some lack of consistency in the year 2000 and some of the 1999 data is missing for the Latinobarometro data. We 
therefore assume that the observations are missing for this year. Thus, we fill in with linear interpolation for the years 2000 and 
1999. As a note of caution, we should add that this survey does not have weights that would allow us to infer that the 
proportions we estimate are completely representative of the entire population. 
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Table A2. Model with governance indicator and crime variables – Reduced sample of Latin American Countries
  Dep Var: FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance * Prim Sector 0.5490** 0.6029** 0.1647 0.2982 
(0.2308) (0.2737) (0.2080) (0.2419) 
Governance * Secondary Sec 0.0298 -0.0373 -0.2229 0.2995 
(0.1302) (0.1905) (0.1750) (0.2109) 
Governance * Tertiary Sector 0.3876 -0.0543 -0.0813 -0.1801 
(0.2625) (0.2544) (0.2440) (0.2703) 
Ln(Crime) * Primary Sector 0.5673 -0.3917 -0.7085 0.2382 -0.3239 -0.6935 
(0.5526) (0.7067) (0.5255) (0.5338) (0.6985) (0.5187) 
Ln(Crime) * Secondary Sector -0.6326** -0.9220** -0.3166 -0.6475** -0.9850** -0.313 
(0.3016) (0.4205) (0.2350) (0.2917) (0.4363) (0.2391) 
Ln(Crime) * Tertiary Sector 0.4761 -1.1046** -0.7320*** 0.6697 -1.1299** -0.7613*** 
(0.4736) (0.4814) (0.1605) (0.4442) (0.4316) (0.1610) 
Controls               
Time FE               
Constant -67.5481 -56.3397 -78.9115 -30.5498 -73.6169 -78.3608 -42.9301 
(79.5257) (59.8166) (48.5924) (130.1472) (68.8607) (49.7379) (139.7019) 
R-squared 0.2921 0.1088 0.1009 0.1412 0.0788 0.0933 0.1332 
Observations 819 405 499 280 405 499 280 
Number of groups 43 40 40 39 40 40 39 
Obs. per group, min. 2 2 4 1 2 4 1 
Obs. per group, max 26 15 15 9 15 15 9 
Obs. per group, avg. 19.05 10.12 12.47 7.179 10.12 12.47 7.179 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimations derived from the model including 
homicide rates shown in columns 2 and 5, including crime victimization index shown in columns 3 and 6, and including organised crime index in columns 4 and 7. 
Fixed Effects model used in all estimations. Control variables are GDPpc, population, trade openness, exchange rates and, inflation. All variables are entered as lags 
except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year period). 
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Table A3. Model with composite and political risk indices and crime variables - Reduced sample of Latin American Countries 
  Dep Var: FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Risk * Prim Sec 0.0322 0.0022 0.0101 0.0185 0.0221 0.0538 0.0491 0.0382 
(0.0263) (0.0338) (0.0292) (0.0587) (0.0271) (0.0534) (0.0331) (0.0423) 
Risk * Sec Sec 0.0184 -0.0349 -0.034 -0.005 0.0103 -0.0246 -0.0231 0.0351 
(0.0192) (0.0373) (0.0291) (0.0377) (0.0147) (0.0269) (0.0235) (0.0361) 
Risk * Ter Sec 0.0608*** -0.0009 0.0053 -0.0075 0.0511** -0.0076 0.0085 0.0188 
(0.0200) (0.0197) (0.0219) (0.0307) (0.0194) (0.0229) (0.0259) (0.0371) 
Ln(Crime) * Prim Sec 0.2324 -0.323 -0.6709 0.4708 -0.4086 -0.7067
  (0.5390) (0.7145) (0.5188)  (0.6158) (0.7426) (0.5199) 
Ln(Crime) * Sec Sec -0.6775** -1.0695** -0.319 -0.6585** -0.9124** -0.3101 
(0.2655) (0.4067) (0.2426) (0.2693) (0.4193) (0.2315) 
Ln(Crime) * Ter Sec 0.6614 -1.1349*** -0.7711*** 0.6027 -1.1320** -0.7676*** 
(0.4398) (0.4032) (0.1582) (0.4509) (0.4582) (0.1642) 
(0.0636) (0.3662) (0.2898) (0.4875) (0.0645) (0.3543) (0.2547) (0.4712)
Controls                 
Time FE                 
Constant -48.8315 -85.7367 -84.0561 -42.496 -53.8312 -73.0161 -82.4657* -70.0876 
(85.1247) (76.1934) (53.6103) (136.0052) (85.4640) (69.1904) (45.3859) (137.7638) 
R-squared 0.2891 0.0845 0.0998 0.1346 0.283 0.0936 0.1104 0.1386 
Observations 819 405 499 280 819 405 499 280 
Number of groups 43 40 40 39 43 40 40 39 
Obs. per group, min. 2 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 
Obs. per group, max 26 15 15 9 26 15 15 9 
Obs. per group, avg. 19.05 10.12 12.47 7.179 19.05 10.12 12.47 7.179 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Estimations derived from the 
model including homicide rates shown in columns 2 and 6, including crime victimization index shown in columns 3 and 7, and including organised crime 
index in columns 4 and 8. Estimations derived from the model including the composite risk index shown in columns 1-4 and including the political risk 
index in columns 5-8. Fixed Effects model used in all estimations. Control variables are GDPpc, population, trade openness, exchange rates and, 
inflation. All variables are entered as lags except initial GDP (initial level of GDP for each 5 year period). 
